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THE FOX GUARDING THE HENHOUSE:
HOW THE HEALTH CARE QUALITY
IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1986 AND STATE
PEER RE VIEW PRO TECTION STATUTES
HA VE HELPED PROTECT BAD FAITH PEER
REVIEW IN THE MEDICAL COMMUNITY
Yann H.H. van Geertruyden*
INTRODUCTION
It is hard to imagine that anyone today would consider being seen by a
physician who failed to wash his or her hands prior to performing an
examination. Confronted with a thirty percent mortality rate of mothers
delivering babies in a hospital compared with a relatively low mortality
rate for women who gave birth in their home, Dr. Ignaz Semmelwies, a
nineteenth century Hungarian obstetrician, is credited with making one of
the most significant discoveries in medicine.' Dr. Semmelwies found that
medical students who failed to wash their hands prior to examination had
infected expectant mothers.2 Today he is regarded as the pioneer of
antiseptic treatment.3
* J.D. Candidate 2002, The Catholic University, Columbus School of Law; B.A.
1996, Kalamazoo College. The author wishes to thank his wife, Brooke, and
family for their contributions and support in the preparation of this article. The
author is most of all grateful to his devoted father whose sacrifices and guidance
have helped him to understand a problem in the medical profession which is
known by many, but spoken of by few.
1. www.semmelweissociety.org (citing "Semmelweis, Ignaz Phillip," Microsoft
(R) Encarta. Copyright 1993 Microsoft Corporations. Copyright 1993 Funk &
Wagnall's Corporation), available at http://www.semmelweisociety.org (last visited
Mar. 12, 2001).
2. Id.
3. www.semmelweissociety.org (citing Sendfelder, Leopold, Ignaz Phillip
Semmelweis(1996)), at http://newadvent.org/cathen/13712a.htm) available at
http://www.semmelweisociety.org (last visited Mar. 12, 2001).
240 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 18:239
Due to personality conflicts with his supervisors and peers, however,
the Viennese medical society rejected his findings, refused to promote
him to clinical professor and eventually ostracized him from the medical
profession.4  Having been forced out of practicing medicine, Dr.
Semmelweis suffered a nervous breakdown, and subsequently was
committed to a mental hospital where he ultimately died.5
Integrity is the cornerstone of how individuals in a community come to
respect and trust a profession. Physicians more so than any other
profession, depend on the integrity of its members to maintain an
exceptionally high level of care and mutual trust with their patients.
Physicians must maintain this level of respect so as not to compromise
their patients' faith in the quality of medical treatment they will obtain.
To maintain the integrity of their practice, an elaborate system of
evaluation has evolved over time to provide for the review and critique of
physicians who may allegedly be perceived as damaging their profession.
Centuries ago, a peer review process was established to review and
monitor physicians to ensure a high quality of care. Today, as a result of a
hospital's responsibility to select and supervise its medical staff,6 the peer
review process has evolved into a more formal process to shield hospitals
from the threat of corporate liability.7 Hospitals delegate the supervision
of its physicians to peer review committees, composed mostly of medical
staff, which review physicians' credentials and quality of care.' These
committees review all applications of physicians for admission to the
medical staff; they also determine what privileges a doctor may have at
the hospital. 9 It is within this peer review process that the opportunity for
corrupt and ulterior motives presents itself.
4. www.semmelweissocity.org (citing Biography, Ignaz Phillip Semmelweis
(1999)), available at http://artemis.austinc.edu/acad/cml/tcates/1997-98/cilld/
semmelweis/biography.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2000).
5. Id.
6. Susan L. Horner, The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986: Its
History, Provisions, Applications and Implications, 16 AM. J. L. AND MED. 455, 458
(1990).
7. See Darling v. Charleston Memorial Community Hospital, 211 N.E.2d 253
(Ill. App. Ct. 1965).
8. See Horner, supra note 6, at 461.
9. Barbara Harty-Golder, M.D., Peer Review and Sour Grapes: Follow These
Steps to Protect Yourself from a Disgruntled Colleague, Physician's Prac. Dig., July
1998, available at http://www.helix.com/resc/ppd/july98/peerrvw.htm.
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Laws at both the national ° and state'1 levels have also been established
to foster and protect the peer review process. These well-intentioned laws
were passed in the 1970s and 1980s to address what was seen as a decline
in the quality of health care in this country, and seek to ensure that
physicians meet a certain standard of care. 2
While hospitals and legislatures have generally been successful in
implementing procedures to review physicians and their practice of
medicine, concern has arisen in the medical community that the process is
fatally flawed in its treatment of the reviewed doctor. Many in the
medical community argue that the peer review process often has little to
do with the actual pursuit of quality of care; but rather it is used as a tool
for economic or political motives - in essence a review performed in bad
faith, or with malice."
This Comment addresses the evolution and current status of bad faith
peer reviews of physicians, focusing on the unanticipated effect certain
federal and state laws have had in promoting bad faith peer review. Part I
provides an in-depth historical overview of the peer review process in the
medical community, focusing in particular on hospital procedures, as well
as federal and state laws that attempt to address the peer review process.
Part II examines the flaws in the current peer review process that allow
for a bad faith peer review to take place. Part III explores the
consequences a bad faith peer review can have on a physician's career.
Part IV presents a case history of bad faith peer review claims, and probes
the difficulties involved in ultimately prevailing on a claim of malice in a
peer review. Finally, this Comment concludes by presenting possible
solutions to the currently flawed physician peer review system that would
remove the opportunity for bad faith peer review. These solutions instead
would encourage a fair and judicious process that would return the flawed
10. See Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-
11152 (1994).
11. Every state, including the District of Columbia, has passed its own version
of a Peer Review Immunity Law to address peer review of physicians licensed in
their state. See Lee J. Stillwell, AM. MED. ASS'N, A COMPENDIUM OF STATE PEER
REVIEW IMMUNITY LAWS, (1994).
12. See Ron A. Virmani, M.D., Medical Errors, Peer-Review & The National
Practitioner Data-Bank, LSUMC BYTES (2001), at
http://www.lsumcbytes.com/bios/errors.html.
13. See, e.g., Josephine M. Hammack, The Antitrust Laws and the Medical
Peer Review Process, 9 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 419, 421 (1993).
20011
242 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 18:239
peer review process to its original goal, namely, to guarantee a high
quality of health care for all Americans.
I. THE CURRENT PEER REVIEW PROCESS
A. Historical Overview
Some form of a peer review process in the medical community has been
present in the United States prior to its declaration of independence from
England. 4 Beginning in the mid-eighteenth century, "when American
colonies created boards of medical examiners to evaluate and license
individuals they found qualified to practice medicine, the States have
regulated the practice of medicine."' 5 In addition, the medical profession
saw the development of professional societies that "developed
professional standards that the States adopted to monitor physicians."' 6
In order to practice medicine today, physicians not only need a license to
practice, but also must meet a number of other requirements, including
hospital privileges, to offer complete and quality care to their patients. 7
Hospital (clinical) privileges are defined by the Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Health Care Organizations (JCAHO) as the "permission
to provide medical or other patient care services in the granting
institution, within well-defined limits, based on the individual's
professional license and his experience, competence, ability, and
judgment."' 8 It is nearly impossible for a physician to practice without
hospital privileges.' 9 With the advent of technology and support services
that only hospitals are able to afford, such as medically staffed operating
rooms, patient wards, or diagnostic equipment, it is vital to a physician's
practice to acquire these hospital privileges. It is at this stage in a
physician's career that the peer review process plays such a critical role in
determining the fate of their ability to practice medicine. Any refusal or
curtailment of physicians' hospital privileges has a devastating effect on
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their practice. However, to maintain privileges at a hospital, physicians
must be willing to be reviewed by a committee (usually made up of their
peers), which determines whether they are qualified to practice medicine
21at the hospital.
B. The Peer Review Process in Hospitals
Each hospital or medical facility generally will have in its bylaws an
22established procedure for conducting a peer review of a physician. The
peer review committees conducting the reviews are composed of
physicians at the hospital or facility who already have privileges and are
members of the medical staff.23 While the peer review process was
originally established to provide for a periodic review of the quality of
care provided by a physician, it has now "developed into the primary
method of evaluating the [general] quality of physician services at a
hospital. 24  The peer review process now provides a hospital with
continuous clinical evaluation and monitoring of physicians who are, or
would like to practice medicine at its facility.25 Most hospitals establish a
"credentials committee" which is composed of physicians from the
hospital who typically practice in the field of the reviewed physicians.26
For an initial applicant, the credential committee conducts a review of
past performance and clinical experience.2' For staff members who
already have privileges at the hospital, "the peer reviewers are also able to
review quality assurance data, diagnostic and laboratory utilization
reports and other information regarding each staff member's actual
practice at the hospital.,
28
After a peer review group has evaluated the physician, it forwards its
findings to the governing body of the hospital, typically the hospital
board.29 The board then makes the ultimate decision regarding whether
21. See Virmani, supra note 12.
22. See Tomes, supra note 14, at 10.
23. Susan 0. Scheutzow, State Medical Peer Review: High Cost But No Benefit
- Is it time for a Change?, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 12 (1999).
24. Id. at 12-13.
25. Id. at 12. See also Tomes, supra note 14, at 9.
26. See Tomes, supra note 14, at 23.
27. See Scheutzow, supra note 23, at 13.
28. Id. at 14.
29. Id. at 12.
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or not to grant a physician privileges to practice medicine at the hospital.30
Depending on the state, a hospital board can be made up of medical staff,
administrators, physicians or other interested parties." Boards can make
a number of decisions based on the findings of the peer review group:
"Based on the reports of the clinical departments, the credentials
committee and others that may have been involved, the executive
committee recommends either a denial, reduction, or revocation of
privileges. The board of trustees has the final decision-making authority
for medical staff appointments.... "32 Typically, however, the governing
board will defer to the recommendations of the medical staff.3
Once the governing board has determined whether or not to grant,
deny, or curtail a physician's privileges, the reviewed physician has few
options to challenge a decision with which he disagrees. The physician is
left with little if any appellate options. Since a hospital is considered
independent, and responsible for its own decisions, the health care entity
(usually the hospital) makes the final decision of whether to grant, deny,
restrict or revoke the staff privileges of a physician.3 The hospital,
however, is required to adhere to certain guidelines for its own peer
review promulgated by JCAHO, federal and state law.3
C. Independent Peer Review Guidelines
The JCAHO, for example, requires that a health care facility provide
limited due process protections as well as peer review standards in their
bylaws." States have also established due process procedures for peer
review actions. The Illinois State Medical Society's Due Process
Guidelines, for example, sets out specific procedures that a hospital must
follow in a peer review or credentialing decision.37 Specific instructions
30. See Tomes, supra note 14, at 22.
31. See id.
32. Id. at 23-24.
33. See id. at 24.
34. See id. at 48. See also Laura-Mae Baldwin, M.D. et al., Hospital Peer
Review and the National Practitioner Data Bank: Clinical Privileges Action
Reports, 282 JAMA 349, 354 (1999) (stating that the "governing board of the
facility has the final authority with respect to the award, denial, reduction, or
revocation of medical staff privileges.").
35. See id.
36. See id. at 42.
37. See id. at 42.
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are given regarding proper notification requirements, a physician's right
to a hearing, an unbiased review as well as a right to be represented by
counsel&m Nevertheless, the problem remains that the sanctioned
physician is unable to appeal beyond the governing board of the
hospital." There is no independent body in place to review a hospital's
decision on peer review matters.' As a result, many consider peer review
as an overly autonomous and arbitrary process providing a physician no
readily available recourse short of filing a lawsuit for a wrongful action.41
D. Federal Legislation and Controlling Law of Peer Review
Hospitals became greatly concerned in 1986 following the Supreme
Court's landmark decision in Patrick v. Burget,42 which involved a
physician who was found to be a victim of a malicious peer review.43 The
Supreme Court upheld the suit of a physician who alleged antitrust
violations in the termination of his privileges.44 In response to this
decision, the federal government addressed the issue of encouraging peer
review through statutory protections by Congress' enactment of the
Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (HCQIA).45 Additionally,
each state and the District of Columbia has passed its own peer review
statutes that encourage thorough and quality control of physicians
practicing in its jurisdiction.46 The primary function of these statutes is to
provide the hospital, the peer review board and the accusing physician
immunity from a libel suit brought by the accused physician.47
The HCQIA addresses two issues in its attempt to improve the quality
of care in medicine. First, the act establishes federal protections, already
38. See id. at 42-44.
39. See ILLINOIS STATE MED. SoC'Y, DUE PROCESS GUiDELINES FOR
PHYSICIANS (1988); see Tomes, supra note 14, at 46.
40. See David W. Townsend, Hospital Peer Review is a Kangaroo Court, 3
MED. ECON. 133 (2000), available at
http://me.pdr.net/me.. .rnals/m/data/2000/0207/ thcqia.html.
41. See Charles Silver, M.D., Letter to the Editor: Peer Review, 23 SURGICAL
ROUNDS 432 (2000).
42. 486 U.S. 94 (1986).
43. Horner, supra note 6, at 461.
44. See id.
45. 42 U.S.C. § 11101(4)(1994). See Susan 0. Scheutzow, supra note 23 at 9.
46. See Stillwell, supra note 11.
47. See Tomes, supra note 14.
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found at the state level, that grant immunity to peer review committees.
Second, it establishes the National Practitioner Data Bank49 to monitor
the credentialing of physicians by hospitals and states.50
1. Federal protections of immunity to peer review committees
The HCQIA, like comparable state statutes, provides immunity from
liability for peer review participants." Congress intended to establish
protections for health care professionals who engage in the good faith
evaluation of their peers by limiting the participant's liability.52 Congress
believed that the overriding "threat of private money damage liability
under federal laws, including treble damage liability under Federal
antitrust law, unreasonably discourages physicians from participating in
effective peer review," thus the establishment of federal immunity
protection for peer reviewers. The Act establishes four standards that
peer review actions must meet in order to be eligible for the protections
under the Act.54 The HCQIA requires a peer review to be taken:
(1) in the reasonable belief that the action was in furtherance of
quality of care (2) after a reasonable effort to obtain the facts of
the matter (3) after adequate notice and hearing procedures are
afforded to the physician involved or after such other
procedures as are fair to the physician under the circumstances,
and (4) in the reasonable belief that the action was warranted by
the facts known after such reasonable effort to obtain facts .... "
The Act establishes a presumption that the peer review action meets
the above criteria, "unless the presumption is rebutted by a
preponderance of the evidence."56 Since the peer review committee need
only show the subjective requirement that a "reasonable belief that the
48. See Troyen A. Brennan, M.D., Hospital Peer Review and Clinical
Privileges Actions: To Report or Not Report, 282 JAMA 381 (1999).
49. See 45 C.F.R. § 60.1-14 (2000).
50. See 45 C.F.R. § 60.1-4 (2000).
51. See Scheutzow, supra note 14 at 7, 9.
52. See Tomes, supra note 14, at 64; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101(4)-(5),
11111(a) (1994).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 11101(4) (1994).
54. See id. § 11112(a)(1)-(4); see also § 11111(a) (listing immunity
protections).
55. Id. § 11112(a)(1)-(4) (emphasis added).
56. Id. § 11112(a).
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action was warranted", the accused physician has a heavy burden to
57
overcome.
2. The National Practitioner Data Bank
Another goal of the HCQIA was to establish a "clearinghouse of
information", which would permit hospitals and other health care entities
access to physicians' records who have had adverse actions taken against
them by other hospitals and health care organizations.6 Congress titled
this new information repository the National Practitioner Data Bank
(NPDB). 9 Information reportable to the NPDB includes: medical• 61
malpractice payments6°; any sanctions by a Board of Medical Examiners ;
and any review actions taken by health care entities such as hospitals,• • 62
Health Maintenance Organizations, and professional societies. The goal
of the NPDB is to prevent physicians who have had their privileges
revoked by a hospital from simply going to another hospital to gain
privileges and continue their practice of medicine. 6' Because of the
unique and sensitive nature of the information in the NPDB, the intent of
the legislation was to keep the information strictly confidential. Data
would be made available only for use by hospitals and sele4t health care
entities so that they may be alerted to physicians who had adverse actions
taken against them, that resulted in a loss of their licenses or privileges.6
The information contained in the Data Bank, however, has become
easily obtainable by numerous health care entities with an interest in the• 65
information. Those eligible to request information from the NPDB must
be one of the following: a Board of Medical Examiners or other State
licensing board; a hospital; a health care entity that provides health care
services through a formal peer review process; a professional society that
57. Tanya Albert, LA Verdict Against Peer Review is Reversed, AM. MED.
NEWS, Oct. 9, 2000, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-
pubs/amnews/pick_- 00/ rsbl009.htm.
58. See 45 C.F.R. § 60.2 (2001).
59. Id. § 60.1-14.
60. 45 U.S.C. § 11131 (1994).
61. Id. § 11132 (1994).
62. 45 U.S.C. § 11133 (1994).
63. See Scheutzow, supra note 23 at 7, 10.
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 11137(b)(1) (1994).
65. See Bernard M. Jaffe, M.D., And Then There Were Two, 23 SURGICAL
ROUNDS 9 (2000).
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engages in professional review activity through a formal peer review
process; or a plaintiff's attorney in certain cases. 66 Peer review actions
have always enjoyed confidentiality under the law.67 However, "public
reports [as with the NPDB] negate that confidentiality, making
assessments available to attorneys, to managed care organizations
interested in credentialing physicians, and to members of the media
interested in publicizing certain events., 68 These public reports add
misguided speculation, which confuses the circumstances regarding a
reported physician.
In late 1999, yet another data bank was established by Congress under
the Health Insurance Portability Act of 1996,6' directing the Secretary of
Health and Human Services (HHS) to create the Health Care Integrity
and Protection Data Bank (HIPDB) "to combat fraud and abuse in health
insurance and health care delivery."70 "The new data bank... require[s]
that state and federal law enforcement organizations, licensing and
certifying boards, and private health plans report a range of adverse
actions taken against licensed health care practitioners, providers and
suppliers."7 "The reportable offenses include licensing actions, exclusions
from the Medicare and Medicaid programs and criminal convictions and
• ,,12
civil judgments. While the American Medical Association (AMA)
originally supported the concept of a national data bank for physicians, it
withdrew its support after the data bank was expanded so far as to include
medical malpractice information. AMA president Dr. Thomas R.
Reardon argues, "malpractice information has a relation to competency.
Even the very best physicians are subject to lawsuits, and most
malpractice insurers allow for the settlement of a lawsuit even without the
66. See U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, NATIONAL
PRACTITIONER DATA BANK: FACT SHEET QUERYING (2000); see also 45 C.F.R. §
60.11(a) (2000).
67. See id.
68. Brennan, supra note 48 at 381.
69. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub.L. No.
104-191, § 221(a), 110 Stat. 1996.
70. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTHCARE INTEGRITY
AND PROTECTION DATA BANK: FACT SHEET ON ENTITY ELIGIBILITY (2000).
71. Susan J. Landers, NEW DATA BANK FOCUSES ON FRAUD, AM. MED.
NEWS, Nov. 22-29, 1999, at 5.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 6.
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approval of the physician. 74 Inaccurate or incomplete information can be
devastating to a physician's career if it becomes public.
The introduction of a second data bank to monitor physicians has
raised concern among physicians that the information will be used
incorrectly, or in bad faith, against them when their privileges would come
up for review at a hospital.75 While some protections still exist regarding
who may query the information in the data banks, recent efforts in
Congress are focused on expanding accessibility to information in the data
banks to the general public. In the 106th Congress, Representative
Thomas Bliley (R-VA) introduced legislation that would allow for
complete public access to any of the reported information on the NPDB.76
The Patient Protection Act of 2000 includes a provision that would allow
the general public access to the raw data found in the data bank on
hundreds of thousands of physicians without including an explanation of
what the data contains.77 Consumers would be given access to data that is
meant for experts, creating the possibility for uninformed decisions by lay
individuals who have no expertise in the field. A misinformed public
compounds the problem of false or inaccurate reporting as they will most
likely reconsider being examined by a reviewed doctor. This only
exacerbates the harm to a physician who is a recipient of bad faith peer
review and has limited options to correct his record.
E. State Laws and Peer Review Immunities
Immunity protections are not solely provided for peer reviewers at the
federal level. Each individual state as well as the District of Columbia
offers its own immunity protections for peer reviewers. Not only do states
offer immunity protections from libel suits, as is found at the federal level,
but immunities are also granted to the actual proceedings and records of
78the peer review committees. The state laws offer broad protections for
74. Id.
75. See Silver, supra note 41, at 432.
76. Patient Protection Act of 2000, H.R. 5122, 106"h Cong., (2000).
77. See Landers, supra note 71, at 5.
78. See Tomes, supra note 14, at 66. See also, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, §
1768 (2000) [M]embers of hospital.., medical society committees.., whose
function is the review of... medical care and physicians work.., shall not be
subject to, and shall be immune from, claim, suit, liability, damages, or any other
resource, civil or criminal, arising from any act or proceeding. The records and
proceedings of... members of hospital medical society committees, or of a
2001]
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documents produced by peer review committees and other similarly
situated health care entities, such as health care providers and
professional medical societies. 9 A typical example of a statute protecting
peer review proceedings and documents is Alabama Code section 6-5-
333(d):
All information, interviews, reports, statements or memoranda
furnished to any committee, as defined in this section, and any
findings, conclusions or recommendations resulting from the
proceedings of such committee are privileged. The records and
proceedings of any such committee are confidential and may
only be used by the committee and its members in the exercise
of the committee's proper functions and will not be public
records, available for court subpoena or for discovery
proceedings.' °
Protection statutes like the Alabama section, force physicians to
confront the immense challenge of overcoming a bad faith peer review, a
significant flaw in the peer review process. Physicians who are accused of
wrongdoing are solely at the mercy of the accusing physician(s) and the
peer review committee hearing their case. At this stage in the process,
however, few appellate options are available. Because the records of the
peer review proceeding are confidential and non-discoverable, should an
accused physician choose to contest the decision of a peer review
committee in a civil trial, the plaintiff must overcome a heavy burden to
prove bad faith. A total of seventeen states8' have sought to address this
professional standards review organization ... whose function is the review of...
physicians' work ... shall be confidential and shall be used by such committees or
organizations, and shall not be available for court subpoena or subject to discovery.
(Emphasis added).
79. See Tomes, supra note 14, at 66.
80. Stillwell, supra note 11, see also ALA. CODE § 6-5-333(d) (2001).
81. Id. at vi. [including: Alaska (ALASKA STAT. § 18.23.030 (MICHIE 2000)),
Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-1451 (2000)), California (CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 809.2 (2001)), Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-36.5-104(10)(B)(I-IV)
(2001)), Connecticut (CONN, GEN, STAT. § 19A-17B(B) (2001)), Hawaii (HAW.
REV. STAT. § 663-1.7 (2000)), Illinois (225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 6015 (2001)), Kansas
(KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4915(4)(c) (2001)), Kentucky (Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
311.377 (MICHIE 2001)), Louisiana (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3715.3 (WEST
2001)), Mississippi (MISS. CODE. ANN. § 41-63-9 (2001)), Missouri (Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 537.035 (2000)), New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 317-A:17 (2000)),
Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. § 441.055 (1999)), Rhode Island (R.I. CODE 5 37.3 7
(2001)), South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 36-4-26.1 (MICHIE2001)), and
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problem by qualifying confidentiality and non-discoverability statutes.
These states make an exception in their "non-discoverability" statutes by
permitting "a physician to obtain access to peer review materials when
challenging the curtailment, suspension, termination or denial of staff
privilege."2 In those states, contesting a revocation or curtailment of staff
privileges by the accused physician places a much heavier burden on the
peer review committee to perform a fair and honest review of a
physician's medical records.
In addition, state and federal laws83 include immunity protection for
health care entities participating in the peer review process. 4 "These
statutes provide varying degrees of immunity, ranging from absolute
immunity in all civil suits to qualified immunity in some civil suits." 85
Each state includes in its immunity statute a provision that addresses the
need for good faith in the review process. A typical state statute reads as
follows,
There is no liability on the part of and no action for damages
will arise against the individuals or organizations outlined in
§65-4909(a) supra, for good faith investigation or
communication of information regarding the quality of care of a
patient... if such association or committee or such individual
member thereof acted in good faith and without malice.
(Kansas) 86
This statute illustrates the immense challenge physicians face in
overcoming a bad faith peer review. As discussed later in this Comment,
the burden to show malice or bad faith depends to a large degree on the
information produced in the peer review proceeding.87 It is difficult to
determine whether a fair and non-partial review of the physicians records
actually took place, because the confidentiality and non-discoverability
statutes as presently found in most states make it nearly impossible for an
attorney to gather the evidence necessary to challenge the good faith
question.
Washington (WASH. REV. CODE § 70.41.200 (2001))].
82. Stillwell, supra note 11, at vi.
83. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11151 (1994).
84. See Tomes, supra note 14, at 66.
85. Id.
86. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4915(b) (1994).
87. See infra pp. 261-264.
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II. BAD FAITH PEER REVIEW
A. Flaws in the Peer Review Process
The current process of peer review as a tool for assessing the quality of
health care is the subject of much debate." In 1992, a survey was
conducted of "all published studies from 1966 to 1990 that evaluated the
effectiveness of peer review". 89 The survey came to the conclusion that:
"Overall, physician agreement regarding quality of care is only slightly
better than the level expected by chance. This finding casts considerable
doubt on the standard of practice of peer assessment. ' 9°
Although it is inaccurate to assume that all peer review committees are
predisposed to targeting a certain type of physician, it is nonetheless
accurate to suggest that the peer review process, as currently structured,
offers peer review participants the ability to practice arbitrary peer review
with little fear of repercussion.9' The victims of bad faith peer reviews
share many of the same traits that usually make them an easy target for
those seeking to disqualify them from practicing in a hospital.9
Solo practitioners lacking political support are frequently
victims of arbitrary peer review actions. Physicians in large
groups, who have politically connected mentors and colleagues,
can often deflect disciplinary actions. A solo physician doesn't
have the same resources. Similarly, doctors who are new on
staff and haven't developed strong relationships are on the hot
seat. So are physicians who do procedures that are new or
different.93
Bad faith peer review can involve both the presence of ulterior motives
in the accusations of wrongdoing by peers as well as a failure to invoke
the peer review process to avoid reporting incidents. This results in
arbitrary underreporting. The review process, often seen as a highly
political, can be easily manipulated to achieve economic or power-driven
gains. 94
88. See Scheutzow, supra note 23, at 7,12.
89. Id. at 16.
90. Id.
91. See Townend, supra note 40, at 133.
92. See Virmani, supra note 12.
93. Townend, supra note 40, at 133.
94. Silver, supra note 41, at 432.
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Flaws in the current peer review process have focused on three main
areas. The primary concern is the strong immunity protections afforded
to both accusatory physicians and hospital committees participating in the
review process.9 A second concern with the peer review process is the
lack of consistent and substantive due process procedures available to an
accused physician. A third concern with the peer review process is the
opportunity for underreporting or false reporting.96 The lack of sanctions
for non-reporting has lead some to argue that hospitals should avoid
taking action against physicians through peer review actions.
97
In an effort to remedy these concerns and reassert the integrity
seemingly lost in the current process, many in the medical community are
calling for the revision, expansion or elimination of the process
altogether.98 A serious and thorough review of the current peer review
process is critical, on both the state and federal levels to safeguard a
quality and respected health care system in the future.99
1. Non-discoverability of peer review hearings
Immunity poses special problems for accused physicians who find
themselves at the receiving end of a bad faith peer review action. Due to
the strong language found in a majority of state statutes that prevents
discovery of proceedings involved in a peer review,'°° physicians are
required to overcome an immense burden in showing a court that there
was in fact malice or bad faith involved in the peer review process.
Accusatory physicians who are involved in the peer review process are
easily able to manipulate the process to achieve ulterior motives, such as
eliminating the economic competition in a particular practice field.' 1 The
exemptions provided for in both the HCQIA and state statutes allow for a
broad immunity on materials produced at a peer review hearing, as well
as immunity for physicians and peer review committees from libel suits
brought by the accused physician.'9 In addition, a number of recent court
95. Tomes, supra note 41, at 64.
96. See Scheutzow, supra note 23, at 7, 9.
97. Id. at 54.
98. Brennan, supra note 48, at 381.
99. Id. at 382.
100. Stillwell, supra note 11.
101. See Silver, supra note 41, at 432.
102. See 42 U.S.C. § 11101(4)-(5). See also MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.57(21)
(1994), VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-581.13, 581.17 (1994).
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decisions both at the state and federal level have questioned and
subsequently failed to find immunity privileges in peer review
challenges.
2. Lack of Due Process
An accused physician, who finds himself or herself the recipient of a
negative peer review recommendation, is regrettably left with few due
process options to appeal a final decision by a governing board. In a
majority of states, the JCAHO, and to a large extent the HCQIA, has
established guidelines that a hospital must follow in order to grant a
physician the opportunity to have a hearing on the accusations raised
against them." 4 These procedures might include "[a] written statement of
the charges, [t]imely notice of the hearing, [a] fair hearing, [t]he right to
produce evidence, [tihe right to counsel. . ., [and a]n appeal process."'' 5
Once the governing board makes its final determination, however, the
accused physician is left with no option to appeal the decision of the
board, save attempting to take the hospital, and the accusing physicians,
through a lengthy and costly trial.'6 These guidelines, however, offer
limited appellate procedures for the accused physician. On account of the
severe consequences of losing or having one's license restricted, adequate
appellate procedures would provide the accused physician a neutral
forum in which to have his review conducted.
3. Underreporting of peer review actions
Underreporting of peer review actions by hospitals and health care
entities has also recently become a problem. In 1995, the Office of
Inspector General (OIG) published a report' 7 that "raised concern that
there may be underreporting by hospitals of physicians with performance
problems."' Under HCQIA, hospitals are required to report to the
NPDB any actions against a physician to include: medical malpractice
103. Brennan, supra note 48, at 382.
104. Tomes, supra note 14, at 41-48.
105. Id. at 42.
106. See id. at 22-23. See also Silver, supra note 41, at 432.
107. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH HUMAN
SERVICES, PUB. No. OE-01-94-00050, HOSPITAL REPORTING TO THE NATIONAL
PRACTIONER DATA BANK (1995).
108. Baldwin et al., supra note 34, at 350.
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109 •. 110
payments , licensure actions taken by the Board of Medical Examiners ,
and adverse actions on clinical privileges."' The NPDB requires the
reporting of two types of actions, those that adversely affect clinical
privileges for a period of more than thirty days, and in those cases where
there is a surrendering or restriction of privileges while the physician is
under investigation.1
2
Despite the strict reporting requirements and the possible imposition of
fines for non-reporting, the 1995 0IG report found that over a three-year
period, nearly three-quarters of all hospitals had failed to report a single
action to the NPDB."3 Most hospitals have developed strategies to avoid
reporting to the NPDB. Hospitals can either impose a suspension that is
less than the thirty day reporting requirement imposed by the Act or
utilize "alternative disciplinary mechanisms that don't require data bank
reporting, such as written reprimands and different types of counseling or
warning systems.' 4 A leading reason why hospitals may decide to pursue
actions to avoid reporting is to protect a physician from possible scrutiny,
but also "public reports negate ... confidentiality, making assessments
available to attorneys, to managed care organizations interested in
credentialing physicians, and to members of the media interested in
publicizing certain events.""'1 Publicity is something both physicians and
hospitals want to avoid, so hospitals utilize alternative ways of reporting
claims."6
III. CONSEQUENCES OF BAD FAITH PEER REVIEW
The consequences that accused physicians must face when confronted
with a bad faith peer review decision can be devastating. Areas that will
be impacted by an adverse action on behalf of a peer review committee
109. 42 U.S.C. § 11131(a) (1994).
110. Id. § 11132 (a)(1).
111. Id. § 11133 (a)(1).
112. Id. § 11133(a)(1)(A)-(B).
113. See Baldwin, et al., supra note 34.
114. Phyllis Maguire, New Data Bank Casts Wider Net: How the Fraud Busters
Threaten to Turn up the Heat on Physicians, ACP-ASIM OBSERVER, Jan. 1999,
available at http://www.acponline.org/journals/news/jan99/databank.htm.
115. See 42 U.S.C. § 11101(4)-(5). See also MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.57(21)
(1994), VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-581.13, 581.17 (1994).
116. Id.
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include: reporting to the NPDB, loss or suspension of privileges,
notification to insurance/HMO/Medicare and damaged reputation in the
medical community all resulting in an overall inferior quality of care.
A. Loss of Hospital Privileges
As discussed previously, in the modern medical profession, hospital
privileges are critical for a physician to practice medicine. 17 A physician
must have access to hospital resources in order to provide quality care and
effective medicine to his patients. Hospitals offer operating facilities,
rehabilitation services, expensive life support equipment and critical
nursing staff without which most doctors would be unable to practice
competent and responsible medicine. " "
Once a physician peer review occurs, a recommendation is made to the
governing board of the hospital as to what type action, if any, should be
taken." 9 Essentially, any action taken that refuses, terminates, suspends
or restricts a physician's privileges at the hospital is an impediment to a
physician's ability to practice. In addition, when an adverse board
decision occurs, a physician will also receive a devastating blow to his or
her reputation both in the medical and patient communities."O The
damage to a physician's reputation will have a longstanding effect on the
physician's marketability, regardless of whether the disciplinary action is
overturned. Other physicians may hesitate to refer patients, and patients
themselves may feel uncomfortable with a physician who has a
questionable record." Once all appeal procedures are exhausted at the
hospital level, the only alternatives left for a physician are to pursue a
costly legal remedy through a claim under antitrust law or to file a libel
suit alleging bad faith peer review under HCQIA or similar state
112statute. Faced with the legal burden of proving bad faith, combined
with the confidentiality and immunity protections provided at both the
state and federal level, the chances of an unemployed, or negatively
117. See supra Part I.A.
118. See John E. Graf, Comment, Patrick v. Burget: Has the Death Knell
Sounded for State Action Immunity in Peer Review Antitrust Suits?, 51 U. Prrr. L.
REV. 463, 463 (1989).
119. See Scheutzow, supra note 23, at 13.
120. See Tomes, supra note 14, at 58.
121. See id.
122. See Hammack, supra note 13, at 421.
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affected physician pursuing a court battle are slim.
B. National Practitioner Data Bank Report
Not only must a physician who is a victim of a bad faith peer review
overcome the exclusion or suspension from practicing medicine at the
accusing hospital, but he or she must also confront the hospital's duty to
124report the adverse action to the NPDB. Under the NPDB, reporting of
credentialing actions, malpractice payments and licensure actions is
125mandatory. Once the action is reported to the NPDB, the consequences
reach far beyond the community in which the adverse action was taken.
The NPDB has become a primary tool for determining privilege and
116credentialing of physicians. Under the HCQIA, hospitals have an
affirmative duty to query the NPDB when a physician applies for medical
• i 127
staff privileges or requests clinical privileges. Joseph A. Berry, National
Medical Director of United HealthCare Corporation, states that the
NPDB is "the primary source of information about sanctions and
malpractice information" regarding a physician's practice history.' 28 Thus,
great care must be taken in managing the information reported on the
NPDB.
Once a report has been submitted to the NPDB, whether legitimate or
not, any hospital at which the reprimanded physician attempts to obtain
privileges will be notified of the adverse action. Due to the reporting
requirements of the NPDB, the reviewed physician is essentially
"blacklisted"'' 29 in both the community where he or she practices, as well
as other communities in which the physician may wish to practice.3 In
addition, other health care entities, such as HMOs, insurance companies
and government agencies (e.g. Veteran's Administration and the Health
Care Financing Administration) all have access to the data in the NPDB.
123. See Silver, supra note 41, at 432.
124. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11131-11133 (1994). See also Baldwin et al., supra note 113.
125. 45 C.F.R. § 60.5 (2000).
126. See Maguire, supra note 114.
127. 42 U.S.C. § 11135(a)(1) (1994). A hospital is also required to query the
NPDB every two years concerning a physician who is on their medical staff or has
clinical privileges at the hospital. 42 U.S.C. § 11135(a)(2) (1994).
128. See Maguire, supra note 114.
129. See Virmani, supra note 12.
130. See id.
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A process exists to appeal a report made to the NPDBY" "The
regulations establish a procedure whereby a physician can dispute the
accuracy of the information in the Data Bank concerning himself.', 32 The
physician must contact the Secretary of Health and Human Services
(HHS), who is in charge of maintaining the database, and inform the
Secretary of the disagreement. 3  The Secretary will then review the
information and determine whether the information is correct or whether
a rescission is necessary.14 Again, this is not an appellate procedure of the
actual peer review action; it is simply an appeal of the reported
information.
Although a process exists for doctors who have had adverse actions
reported against them to dispute the NPDB report, "the damage it does
may be too difficult to overcome.' ' 35 By the time a doctor even receives a
hearing on the matter, "in the case of a summary suspension, the damage
may already be done."'36 The mere perception that a doctor may have
had an adverse action taken against her is enough to prevent the doctor
from gaining privileges at another hospital. 1 7 To compound the problem,
physicians who have undergone the peer review process, regardless of
being found innocent of the allegations made against them, may still be
victims of disparate treatment. Although the NPDB was originally
intended to monitor problem physicians, many in the medical community
are concerned that it has accomplished the complete opposite, leading to
the unintended consequence of destroying the careers of many qualified
physicians.'39
IV. CASE HISTORY IN BAD FAITH PEER REVIEW
A. Immunity of Peer Review Actions
In large part due to the immunity and confidentiality protections
131. 45 C.F.R. § 60.14 (2000).
132. Tomes, supra note 14, at 10.
133. 45 C.F.R. § 60.14(b) (2000). See also infra note 136.
134. 45 C.F.R. § 60.14(c) (2000).
135. Townsend, supra note 40, at 133.
136. Id.
137. See id. at 1-2.
138. 42 U.S.C. § 11134(b) (1994). See also, 45 C.F.R. § 60.1 (2000).
139. See Silver, supra note 41, at 432.
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afforded peer reviewers and the proceedings, it is extremely unlikely that
a suit alleging bad faith will result in a trial proceeding."'4 Prior to 1986
and the passage of the HCQIA, physicians had a number of bases
available to challenge arbitrary peer review, such as defamation and
breach of contract. The seminal case in the law concerning medical peer
review is Patrick v. Burget. 14 In Patrick, a physician was subjected to peer
review involving malice after he elected not to join a town's only medical
practice. The Supreme Court upheld a jury's decision to award the
physician 2.2 million dollars in damages for the exercise of bad faith peer
review. In addition, the Court's decision addressed the notion that
hospitals were immune from antitrust suits.
As a result of the lower court's decision in Patrick to award damages,
and before the Supreme Court's final decision on the matter, Congress
passed the HCQIA that federalized the peer review immunity statutes
that were already found in some states. The Court in Patrick, notes that
by enacting HCQIA, "Congress clearly noted and responded to the
concern that the possibility of antitrust liability will discourage effective
peer review."'43  The Court went on to recognize that "[tihe Act
essentially immunizes peer-review action from liability if the action was
taken 'in the reasonable belief that [it] was in furtherance of quality
health care.""" Since the passage of the HCQIA, physicians may only
sue if they can demonstrate that the hospital did not provide the physician
adequate due process during the peer review process, or if the physician
can show bad faith was involved. Since hospitals have the ability to
keep peer review proceedings strictly confidential, challenging a peer
146review on the basis of bad faith is very difficult. Since Patrick and the
passage of the HCQIA, few courts have been willing to allow a physician
to overcome the immunity and confidentiality protections afforded peer
review proceedings. 47 Disciplined physicians must overcome the difficult
burden of proving bad faith to challenge a peer review decision.
140. Albert, supra note 57.
141. See Townend, supra note 40.
142. Patrick v. Burget, 800 F.2d 1498 (91h Cir. 1986), rev'd 486 U.S. 94 (1988).
143. Patrick, 486 U.S. at 106.
144. Patrick, 486 U.S. at 105.
145. See Townend, supra note 40.
146. Id.
147. See Albert, supra note 57.
148. See Mathews v. Lancaster General Hospital, 87 F.3d 624 (Tenn. 1996)
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Some rare cases, however, have been upheld where a showing of
blatant and extreme bad faith existed. In Brown v. Presbyterian
HealthCare Services, 149 a jury found that there had in fact been an element
of bad faith involved in the peer review of the disciplined physician and
awarded damages accordingly. The district court judge presiding over the
case, however, set aside the award concluding that the plaintiff had failed
to present adequate proof of actual damages.5 The Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed the jury's decision that the defendants were not
immune under the HCQIA from antitrust and defamation claims and
granted the compensatory damages to the plaintiff.' The court found
that the facts showed a direct link between the accusing physician who
initiated the peer review action and the ultimate influence on the peer
review committee and governing board. The Court placed particular
attention on the fact that the accusing physician herself was on the
governing board which made the ultimate decision to revoke the
plaintiff's privileges.'53
The proof needed to show a link between malice and the peer review
action is not always as blatant. In Zamanian v. Christian Health Ministry a
physician's license was suspended following a peer review action. In
1998, the doctor's case overcame claims of immunity brought by the
defendant under Louisiana law and was finally allowed to go to trial. The
Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's
summary judgment after finding that "members of the peer review
committee 'may have acted with malice or a lack of good faith' during the
peer review process."'55 The judges had found that there "was evidence
that Mercy Hospital had financial reasons to want to discipline Dr.
Zamanian because he kept patients in the hospital for more days than
Medicare authorized, resulting in the hospital's losing money.', 56 Finally,
(reaffirming the immense burden placed on a physician to show that bad faith was
involved in a peer review and maintaining that there is a strong presumption that
the peer review is performed in good faith).
149. Brown v. Presbyterian Health Care Services, 101 F.3d 1324 (1996).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1334.
152. Id. at 1333-35.
153. Id. at 1335.
154. Zamanian, 715 So.2d 57 (La. App.4th Cir. 1998).
155. See Albert, supra note 57.
156. Id.
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two years after going to trial, in September 2000, a jury awarded Dr.
Zamanian six million in damages finding the peer review process had
been conducted in bad faith.'
Just two weeks later, however, a civil district judge reversed the jury
decision and set aside the award by the jury finding that the peer review
process, which Mercy conducted, was "subject to immunity under state
and federal laws."' 58 The case is currently on appeal. Again, this case
highlights the immense burden placed on the disciplined physician to
show that there is malice or bad faith involved in the peer review process.
Even if a doctor can make a showing that bad faith is involved, he must
still be willing and able to expend the cost of pursuing a lengthy legal
battle."' Few cases persevere this far into the process."6 In fact, this was
the first case of its kind to reach a jury trial in Louisiana. 6'
B. The Hurdle of Non-Discoverability Peer Review Statutes
Overcoming the immunity protections provided at both the state and
federal level is not the only challenge facing a disciplined physician.
Often, overcoming the burden of proving bad faith depends on revealing
information disclosed during the actual peer review proceedings. As
discussed previously, some states have made an exception to their non-
discoverable peer review statutes, allowing discovery when a physician is
challenging the adverse decision of a peer review committee."' A recent
state Supreme Court decision in Pennsylvania may provide precedent that
a state need not have legislated such an exception for one to be found.
Hayes v. Mercy Health Corp."' involved a physician who had been
suspended by the defendant for his involvement in a malpractice 
claim. 64
After a hearing on the suspension, a peer review committee determined
157. Id.
158. Id. at 14.
159. See Virmani, supra note 12.
160. Albert, supra note 57.
161. See id.
162. See Stillwell, supra note 11, at viii.
163. Hayes, 559 Pa. 21, 739 A.2d 114 (1999).
164. Id. See also Renee H. Martin, New Peer Review Confidentiality Issues,
PHYSICIAN'S NEwS, Dec. 1999, available at http://www.physiciansnews.com/law/
1299.html.
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that "the facts do not support suspension" .16' Later, however, the
hospital's Medical Board altered the peer review committee's findings to
state, "the facts do not support continued suspension", implying the
suspension had been warranted at some point, resulting in a permanent
mark on the physicians record in the NPDB.' 66 It came to the attention of
the plaintiff that there was bad faith involved when the Medical Board
made their finding and the plaintiff sought a copy of an audio tape made
of the Board's meeting to determine if in fact bad faith had played a role
in the decision.' 67 The hospital refused and the physician sued to acquire a
copy of the tape.
In its decision, the court focused on the intent of the Pennsylvania
statute which sought to keep peer review proceedings confidential.'9 The
statute states that peer review proceedings are to remain confidential "in
any civil action... arising out of the matters which are the subject of
evaluation and review by such committee.' '169 The court interpreted the
language of the statute to mean that it was intended "to prevent the
disclosure of peer review information to outside parties seeking to hold
professional health care providers liable for negligence, while at the same
time ensuring.., confidentiality did not operate to shield from discovery
those rare instances in which the peer review process was misused."' 7°
The court held that the plaintiff should receive a copy of the tape with the
restriction that it be only used to determine if the proceedings had been
misused.1
71
Hayes v. Mercy is important for a number of reasons. The Hayes-court
acknowledges that there should be exceptions made to the confidentiality
provision in states where it is not expressly worded in statute. The court
recognized that the issues at stake were the fairness and integrity of the
peer review proceedings and whether the plaintiff-physician was the




168. See id. See also Peer Review Protection Act, 63 PA. CONS. STAT. §§
425.1-.4 (1996).
169. Id. See also 63 PA. CONS. STAT. § 425.4 (1996).
170. Martin, supra note 164; see also Hayes, 559 Pa. 21 (1999).
171. Id.
172. See Danielle Rodier, Justices: Doctor Can Use Tape of Peer Review to
Clear Name; Allegations of Misuse Outweigh Concerns of Confidentiality, LEGAL
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review organizations have been used to weed out competitors rather than
investigate health care concerns. This decision prevents peer-review
organizations from being misused." '73 Hayes also highlights the difficulty
facing a physician who attempts to clear his name. The cost to overcome
a confidentiality statute and to show bad faith is something that most
physicians are simply unable to afford.
Unfortunately, Pennsylvania has been the only state to make such a
finding.'74  Most recently, in June 2000, the Appeals Court of
INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 6, 1999, at http://lawnewsnetwork.com/stories/A7061-
19990ct5.html.
173. Id.
174. It is important to note that the federal courts do not necessarily follow
the decisions of state courts. Two recent landmark federal court decisions have
refused to recognize state privilege protections to peer review material. These
cases signal an important trend in the treatment of peer review material that will
hopefully lead state courts to follow their findings.
In Virmani v. Novant Health Inc., 259 F.3d 284 (7h Cir. 2001), the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals refused to allow a hospital to assert a North Carolina peer
review statute to protect material disclosed during a peer review hearing involving
one of its physicians. The plaintiff, Dr. Ashutosh Virmani, had filed suit against
the hospital for unlawfully terminating his medical staff privileges, alleging
discrimination based on race and national origin. Dr. Virmani sought to compel
the records of the peer review to support his claim. The hospital refused to
disclose the material, claiming the records were privileged from discovery under
the North Carolina peer review protection statute. The Seventh Circuit, noting
that it is thus far the only Circuit Court to squarely address the issue, rejected the
hospitals assertion, holding that "the interest in obtaining probative evidence in an
action for discrimination outweighs the interest that would be furthered by
recognition of a privilege for medical peer review materials. Therefore, [the
court] refuses to recognize such a privilege." Virmani, 259 F.3d 284, 293 (7 "h Cir.
2001).
Following the Seventh Circuit's decision in Virmani, the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Indiana, upheld the Virmani decision in a
similar case involving an alleged claim if disability discrimination. In Mattice v.
Memorial Hospital of South Bend, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15076 (Sept. 21, 2001),
the plaintiff, Dr. Thomas Mattice, had sought to compel disclosure of documents
relating to a medical peer review of Dr. Mattice. The Hospital sought to prevent
discovery of the documents, asserting the documents were privileged under an
Indiana peer review statute. The District Court, citing the decision in Virmani,
determined that when "the state-law medical peer review privilege [is weighed]
against the interests advanced by the federal anti-discrimination laws, the privilege
does not preclude discovery of peer review materials." Mattice, 2001 U.S. Dist.
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Massachusetts considered in Grande v. Lahey Clinic, whether the
reviewed physician could depose an expert used in a peer review action in
a subsequent defamation suit.' 76 The plaintiff, Dr. Grande, who was
cleared in the peer review action, sought to depose the expert to
determine if she was aware of any bad faith being involved in the peer
review action. The appeals court held that the non-discoverable peer• .• 178
review protection applied to the expert's testimony. Thus, the plaintiff
was prevented from discovering potentially damaging testimony that
would support his defamation suit.
V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO A FLAWED PEER REVIEW PROCESS
A. Current Remedies Available
As discussed earlier, options for a disciplined physician are currently
179 M8somewhat limited. The HCQIA, JCAHO,' as well as the statutes of. . 181
most states, set out guidelines for hospitals to follow when conducting a
peer review. These guidelines are incorporated into the bylaws of a
hospital and must be followed in order for a court to conclude that a
doctor was given "due process..'. Such bylaws, however, are often
drafted in favor of protecting the hospital, and can be very difficult for a
physician to discern."' These bylaws can impose limited administrative
LEXIS 15076, 8 (Sept. 21, 2001). The District Court agreed with the Seventh
Circuit that in the case of a federal discrimination claim, "peer review documents
are not privileged and are subject to discovery." Mattice, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15076, 12 (Sept. 21, 2001).
Of course, these cases involve claims that arise in federal court.
Unfortunately, as mentioned in the Comment, state courts have been reluctant to
come to the same conclusion as their federal counterparts.
175. Grande, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 77, 725 N.E.2d. 1083 (2000).




179. 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a)-(b) (1994).
180. See Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations,
Accreditation Manual for Hospitals (1990). See also Tomes, supra note 14, at 42.
181. See Tomes, supra note 14, at 42.
182. Id. at 42-45.
183. See Townsend, supra note 40, at 133.
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procedures and even restrict a physician's ability to utilize an attorney in
the proceedings.1' 4 The primary problem remains, however, that the
appeals process ends with a decision by the governing body of the
hospital. Once the governing body makes its decision, it is very difficult
to obtain any additional review of the adverse action. Most courts are
unwilling to hear a suit on the merits brought by the disciplined physician
challenging the decision of a peer review board." 6 A disciplined physician
has no other recourse against a bad faith peer review decision other that
to file a suit for libel.
Immediately following an adverse decision made by the peer review
committee and approved by the board, the finding is forwarded to the
National Practitioner Data Bank. At this point, the disciplined physician
acquires some appellate options, but only with regard to the report posted
on the NPDB. '87 The physician has the ability to petition the Secretary of
HHS to review the report, and if the Secretary determines there is no• •188
basis for the report, the record will be cleared. This procedure is limited
to having the adverse report expunged from the physician's record.
Further, it does nothing to affect the hospital board's decision, not to
mention clear the physician's name in the community.
Should a physician find that bad faith or malice was involved in the
proceedings, she can take the matter to court under a defamation or
antitrust claim. '89  To overcome the immunity and confidentiality
protections afforded to peer review proceedings under state and federal
laws, a showing of bad faith must be made.1'9 Antitrust is one theory of
184. See id.
185. See Tomes, supra note 14, at 22.
186. Moreover, the Oregon courts have indicated that even if they were
to provide judicial review of hospital peer-review proceedings, the review
would be of a very limited nature. The Oregon Supreme Court, in its
most recent decision addressing this matter, stated that a court 'should
[not] decide the merits of plaintiff's dismissal' and that '[i]t would be
unwise for a court to do more than to make sure that some sort of
reasonable procedure was afforded and that there was evidence from
which it could be found that plaintiff's conduct posed a threat to patient
care.'
Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 104-05 (1988)(citation omitted).
187. 45 C.F.R. § 60.14(a) (2000).
188. 45 C.F.R. § 60.14(c)(2)(ii) (2000).
189. See Horner, supra note 6, at 461.
190. 42 U.S.C §§ 11102(a), 11137(b)(1) (1994). See Tomes, supra note 14, at
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law under which courts may be more willing to hear cases involving bad
faith."' Even though courts are more reluctant to find antitrust violations
in the area of health care, the Supreme Court has held in several key
decisions that an antitrust claim against a health care provider, like a
hospital, is subject to federal jurisdiction'93 and that health care providers
may not necessarily use traditional defenses against those suits. 94
With the passage of the HCQIA, however, alleging an antitrust
violation has proven to be much more difficult because the Act requires
merely that a peer review action be taken "in the reasonable belief that
the action was in the furtherance of quality health care."' 95 The broad
standards afforded to health care entities in the HCQIA afford hospitals a
great number of options to protect themselves from an antitrust
allegation, including having the "bylaws expressly provide that the
committee's recommendations to the Hospital Board in no way preclude
the Board from exercising its own judgment; or a hospital could rely on
pro-competitive justifications." '9' These techniques allow hospitals to
avoid litigation by claiming they are doing everything they can to remain
objective.
B. Possible Solutions
This Comment is by no means intended to suggest that the medical
profession is free of substandard physicians. Nor is it meant to suggest
that appropriate evaluations of physicians should be eliminated. On the
contrary, it is intended to highlight a problem in the medical community
that is not often discussed. The peer review process as it exists today, is
flawed. The following are suggested changes to both the peer review
system, as well as the medical evaluation system in general, which seek to
achieve the goals of fairness in the evaluation process and achieve a
higher quality of care.' 97 When compromises are made in the evaluation
64.
191. See Tomes, supra note 14, at 51. See also Hammack, supra note 13, at
429.
192. See Tomes, supra note 14, at 51.
193. See Summit Health Ltd. v. Pinhas, 111 S. Ct. 1842, 1850 (1991). See also
Hammack, supra note 13, at 421.
194. Patrick, 486 U.S. at 105.
195. 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a)(1) (1994).
196. Hammack, supra note 13, at 449.
197. See id. at 450.
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process, the end result is that the integrity of the medical -community-
and especially the quality of care that patients receive-suffers.
1. Expansion of the current peer review appeals process
Much of the problem that plagues the current peer review system stems
from the lack of any meaningful appellate procedure available to the
accused physician. Once the governing board has made a determination,
the disciplined physician has no alternative but to accept the decision."'
Creating a method of allowing a sanctioned physician to appeal a decision
to an independent review board outside of the hospital would alleviate
much of the ambiguity tainting the current system.199 An independent
analysis of all the facts offered by independent reviewers would likely
neutralize much of the pressure facing both peer reviewers in addition to
those being peer reviewed. Physicians who perform the initial peer
review of their colleague's work would surely welcome an independent
analysis to ensure consistent application of generally accepted medical
standards. If, however, they are confident of their review, these reviewing
physicians could assert at a libel trial that an independent review board
agreed with their findings.2°°
A similar alternative would be to allow a state agency oversight over
the activities of hospitals within their jurisdiction. 2° State medical boards
are already responsible for the licensing of physicians within the state20,
although the boards are not responsible for oversight of granting staff
privileges in a hospital. As the importance of acquiring such privileges in
a hospital has become so critical to practicing medicine within the state, it
follows that states should play a role in overseeing which physicians are
afforded privileges. As a result of the "decrease in the amount of
reimbursement and more hospitals closing, there is more competition to
be placed in the hospital staff. Peer review organizations have been used
198. See Tomes, supra note 14, at 22.
199. See Virmani, supra note 12.
200. A caution put forward by physicians against removing the confidentiality
protections is the risk of a libel suit. In light of the accepted tort concept that the
medical profession is no longer limited to local customs, physicians would be able
to assert that an independent review board agreed with their findings, releasing
themselves from the liability of slander.
201. See Townsend, supra note 40, at 133.
202. See Tomes, supra note 14, at 11.
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to weed out competitors rather than investigate health-care concerns."
20 3
State oversight would consist merely of a review panel of doctors from
around the state who would review the peer review committee's findings.
It could even relieve the hospital of any supervisory activity by simply
allowing all peer review actions to be controlled by the state.
If the state is not willing to accept the responsibility of overseeing the
peer review process, the state should then provide physicians the ability to
immediately appeal the hospital board's decision to the state courts. As
was discussed in Patrick, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged
the unwillingness of the state court system to review hospital privilege
204matters. Physicians should have some recourse available for a quick
and fair review of their discipline.
2. Immunity provisions, and expansion of state exceptions to
non-discoverability provisions
Currently, seventeen states have adopted exceptions to their non-
discoverability peer review provisions.Y These statutes permit physicians
to obtain access to peer review materials when challenging the
curtailment, suspension, termination or denial of staff privileges. The
HCQIA presently does not carry any such protection for disciplined
physicians. Thus, the burden to obtain evidence showing that malice was
present at a peer review proceeding makes it difficult for the disciplined
physician to bring a case alleging bad faith to trial.2°7 While it is important
to keep the peer review proceeding confidential in civil trials involving
malpractice claims, physicians should have the right to inspect and offer
evidence of bad faith discovered at the peer review proceedings.
Likewise, the immunity provisions found under state and federal laws
afforded to physicians who participate in the peer review process must be
relaxed. It is vital to remove the immunity veil that physicians are able to
hide behind, which allows them to manipulate the peer review process in
order to achieve politically or economically motivated goals. By takingaway the immunity shields, physicians will be forced to rely more on
203. Rodier, supra note 172.
204. Patrick, 486 U.S. at 105.
205. See Stillwell, supra note 11, at viii. See also, supra note 81.
206. See id.
207. See Townsend, supra note 40.
208. See Silver, supra note 41, at 432.
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sound medical principles and less on personally driven agendas.
3. Continuous Improvement as a health care solution"'
The peer review process has been criticized not only for its lack of
attention to the possible infusion of bad faith into the proceedings, but
also for its inability to improve the quality of health care provided in the
United States. The peer review process is often viewed in the profession
as aggressive and adversarial.1 Most physicians are put on the defensive
to protect themselves against inquiries that may lead to a complete
revocation of their licenses to practice medicine. An alternative approach
to the peer review process that has been advocated by many in the
medical profession views quality of care not from an adversarial,
aggressive standpoint, but rather from a theory of continuous
• . 211
improvement. In states, like "Massachusetts, for example, a physician
merely talking with a hospital administrator about the physicians
involvement in a mishap may commit a hospital administrator by law to
report that physician to the Board of Registration in Medicine."2 ' 2
Instead of seeking the highest quality of care for their patients, the
existing peer review process conditions physicians to be cognizant of
potential sanctions and adversarial actions, requiring a physician to be
constantly on the defensive.
A competing approach has been advocated, that focuses on "the
Theory of Continuous Improvement," 3 which is the continuous search for
opportunities for all processes to get better.s 21 4  By working with
colleagues towards self-development and improvement, rather than
against them, quality of medical care will be the ultimate beneficiary. We
must allow physicians to "free themselves from the fear, accusation,
defensiveness and naYvetd of an empty search for improvement through
inspection and discipline., 21 '5 By staying on the defensive, health care will
never improve." '
209. Donald M. Berwick, M.D., Continuous Improvement As An Ideal In
Health Care, 320 NEw ENG. J. MED. 53 (1989).
210. See id. at 53; see Jaffe, supra note 65.
211. See Berwick, supra note 209, at 53.
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Critics of the NPDB argue that the national data bank is a good
example of why physicians and hospitals may not seek improvement in
the quality of care. 21' The NPDB imposes strict reporting requirements
211
with consequences that encourage hospitals not to report actions taken.
Rather than attract public exposure to potential problems at the hospital,
health care entities will often seek out alternative corrective measures to
avoid reporting. 9 The alternatives used by health care entities should be
the goal of the NPDB; further education and training should be the rule,
rather than permitting a simple submission of a name to a data bank that
220would effectively end the career of a physician.
CONCLUSION
The quality and integrity of health care in the United States is critical to
the sustainment of prosperity. People expect competent and highly
skilled medical professionals when they utilize the health care system.
Existing quality control measures imposed by state and federal laws seek
to provide a continuous monitoring system that utilizes peers in the
medical profession to evaluate their colleagues. Today's system relies
heavily on immunity and confidentiality protections to shield a peer
reviewer from liability for his participation.
The current immunity and confidentiality protections have the effect of
providing a safe-harbor for physicians who have ulterior motives, whether
economic or political. These physicians abuse the peer review system and
the safe-harbor provisions to eliminate the competition in their
community. In addition, the state and federal laws place an undue burden
on the disciplined physicians to show the presence of malice or bad faith
in the peer review process.
At a minimum, the safe-harbor provisions that protect accusing
physicians from liability for claims made in bad faith, combined with the
incredible burden accused physicians must overcome to show bad faith,
must be removed. Further, an effort should be made to expand a
reviewed physician's appellate options at the state level to ensure an
unbiased and truly independent review of his work. Should the arbitrary
peer review process continue without any changes to the protections
217. See Brennan, supra note 48, at 381.
218. 45 C.F.R. §§ 60.5-.9 (2000).
219. Baldwin, supra note 34, at 354.
220. See Jaffe, supra note 65, at 9.
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currently afforded to peer review committees-or the review process
itself-many outstanding physicians who become the target of an adverse
peer review and are unable to afford costly litigation to clear their name,
will simply be eliminated as they will have no alternative but to quit the
medical profession.

